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Abstract
Expected utility theory (EUT) is widely used in economic theory. However, its subjective probability
formulation, first elaborated by Savage, is linked to Ellsberg-like paradoxes and ambiguity aversion. This
has led various scholars to work out non-Bayesian extensions of EUT which cope with its paradoxes
and incorporate attitudes toward ambiguity. A variant of the Ellsberg paradox, recently proposed
by Mark Machina and confirmed experimentally, challenges existing non-Bayesian models of decision-
making under uncertainty. Relying on a decade of research which has successfully applied the formalism
of quantum theory to model cognitive entities and fallacies of human reasoning, we put forward a non-
Bayesian extension of EUT in which subjective probabilities are represented by quantum probabilities,
while the preference relation between acts depends on the state of the situation that is the object of the
decision. We show that the benefits of using the quantum theoretical framework enables the modeling of
the Ellsberg and Machina paradoxes, as the representation of ambiguity and behavioral attitudes toward
it. The theoretical framework presented here is a first step toward the development of a ‘state-dependent
non-Bayesian extension of EUT’ and it has potential applications in economic modeling.
Keywords: Expected utility theory; Ellsberg paradox; Machina paradox; quantum probability; quantum
modeling.
1 Introduction
Economic theory crucially rests on the so-called ‘Bayesian paradigm’: any source of uncertainty can be prob-
abilistically quantified and the ensuing probability theory satisfies the axioms of Kolmogorov (Kolmogorov,
1933). Von Neumann and Morgenstern successfully applied the Bayesian paradigm when elaborating an
axiomatic form of the expected utility theory (EUT), which is the predominant model of decision-making
under uncertainty (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).
It is however well known that, for many events of interest, one cannot define an objective agreed-upon
probability. This led Savage to extend the von Neumann and Morgenstern ‘objective EUT’ within the
Bayesian paradigm (Savage, 1954). The traditional line of reasoning is that, in the absence of objective
probabilities, the decision-maker forms her/his own subjective probabilities, and takes decisions on the basis
of these subjective probabilities. This is the basic tenet of subjective EUT: individuals take decisions as if
they maximized expected utility with respect to a Kolmogorovian probability measure which is interpreted
as their subjective probability.
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The Bayesian paradigm has been applied with success to several problems in economic modeling. How-
ever, in 1961 Daniel Ellsberg demonstrated in a series of thought experiments that simple situations exist
in which decision-makers violate some of the ‘rationality axioms’ of subjective EUT, preferring certain
to uncertain decisions, rather than maximizing expected utility, a behavior called by Ellsberg ‘ambiguity
aversion’ (Ellsberg, 1961). Ellsberg’s experiments have been actually performed several times, generalized
under different directions, and applied to domains outside decision theory, like in finance, medicine and
actuarial sciences (see, e.g., McCrimmon & Larsson, 1979; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Camerer & We-
ber, 1992; Fox & Tversky, 1995; Viscusi & Chesson, 1999; see also the exhaustive review by Machina &
Siniscalchi, 2014). Most of the experimental findings have confirmed this ambiguity aversion attitude.
An accurate critical analysis of the problems above has led various authors to suggest that the axiomatic
foundations of the Bayesian approach are not so compelling as they seem, and that the Bayesian approach
is probably too limited to cope with any kind of uncertainty that affects human decision-making (Gilboa,
Postlewaite & Schmeidler, 2008). Moreover, axiomatic approaches have been elaborated which cope with
the Ellsberg and other puzzles and extend EUT in a non-Bayesian sense. Relevant examples of non-
Bayesian approaches to decision-making under uncertainty are, e.g., ‘expected utility with multiple priors’
(Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989), ‘Choquet expected utility’ (Schmeidler, 1989), ‘smooth ambiguity preferences
model’ (Klibanoff, Marinacci & Mukerij, 2005), ‘variational preference model’ (Maccheroni, Marinacci &
Rustichini, 2006), and ‘cumulative prospect theory’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) – just to quote the
most celebrated, without the aim of being exhaustive. In addition, these non-Bayesian models have been
effectively applied to economic problems of decision under uncertainty, e.g., the ‘home bias puzzle’, the
‘equity premium puzzle’ (see, e.g., the review by Gilboa & Marinacci, 2013).
More recently, some scholars have proved that the decision-making models above find difficulties to
represent the preferences hypothesized in two variants of the Ellsberg paradox, the ‘50:51 example’ and the
‘reflection example’ (Machina, 2009; Baillon, L’Haridon & Placido, 2011). This ‘Machina paradox’, which
has been confirmed experimentally (L’Haridon & Placido, 2010), claims for new theoretical approaches to
model human preferences and decision-making in the presence of ambiguity.
We put forward in the present paper that the probabilistic formalism of quantum theory, free from any
physical connotation or interpretation, can be used to model human choices in the presence of ambiguity. In
this respect, we apply here the lesson we have learned from quantum physics. A measurement process gives
rise to an interaction between the microscopic quantum entity that is measured and a measuring apparatus,
and thus the latter acts as a measurement context for the former. This contextual interaction is non-
controllable (which is formalized by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle), and determines an intrinsically
probabilistic change of the state of the measured entity. Then, a measurement outcome is actualized among
a set of possible outcomes, as a consequence of this contextual interaction. Whenever one formalizes the
statistical frequencies of repeated experiments to derive probabilities, one discovers that this kind of ‘pure
potentiality’ and ‘contextuality’ cannot be formalized in a single Kolmogorov probability space: they indeed
require quantum probability (Aerts, 2009).
The quantum measurement lesson was firstly applied with success to the representation of conceptual
entities. We introduced the notion of ‘state of a concept’ to model the type of interaction that occurs
when people are asked about membership, or typicality, of specific exemplars with respect to pairs of
concepts and their combinations, e.g., conjunction, disjunction and negation. We applied the quantum-
conceptual approach to solve various difficulties of the Kolmogorovian model of probability in conceptual
combinations. Then, we extended the approach to more complex situations, showing that genuine quantum
effects, i.e. ‘superposition’, ‘interference’, ‘entanglement’, etc., systematically occur in the combination of
natural concepts (Aerts, 2009; Aerts, Broekaert, Gabora & Sozzo, 2013; Aerts, Gabora & Sozzo, 2013;
Aerts, Sozzo & Veloz, 2015; Sozzo, 2015).
The quantum-conceptual approach supports a growing research that uses the mathematical formalism
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of quantum theory to model complex cognitive processes, like probability and similarity judgment, per-
ception, knowledge representation and decision-making. More specifically, quantum models have shown
their effectiveness in the explanation of the so-called ‘fallacies of human reasoning’, like ‘conjunctive and
disjunctive fallacies’, ‘disjunction effects’, ‘question order effects’, etc. (see, e.g., Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012;
Busemeyer, Pothos, Franco & Trueblood, 2011; Haven & Khrennikov, 2013; Khrennikov, 2010; Pothos &
Busemeyer, 2013; Wang, Solloway, Shiffrin & Busemeyer, 2014; Khrennikov, 2015). This novel research
programme has now become a valid alternative to the Kahneman and Tversky theory of individual heuris-
tics and biases in providing an explanation for the observed fallacies (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 1983;
1992).
What about the above paradoxes of EUT? We have recently applied the quantum conceptual approach
to decision-making processes. In a human decision-making process the interaction between the object of
the decision and the decision-maker is of a cognitive nature rather than of a physical nature like it is the
case when quantum models are applied in physics. The result of this interaction leads to the decision
itself, which is actualized among the possible alternatives. Again, the probabilistic model formalizing
the ambiguity occurring in the decision-making interaction cannot generally be Kolmogorovian: it should
be quantum probability. In particular, the notion of state of the cognitive entity that is the object of
the decision, the ‘decision-making (DM) entity’, incorporates the notion of ambiguity and generates the
(non-Kolmogorovian) quantum probability distribution modeling subjective probabilities. In addition,
the change of state of the DM entity after the interaction incorporates attitudes toward ambiguity, e.g.,
‘ambiguity aversion’, or ‘ambiguity attraction’, or even other attitudes, depending on the overall ‘conceptual
landscape surrounding the DM entity’. We also show that preferences between acts are not absolute
notions, but they depend on the state of the DM entity and on how the state of the DM changes as a
consequence of the interaction with the decision-maker. This suggests associating the DM entity with a
family of subjective probability distributions, parametrized by the states of the DM entity itself. We thus
put forward a ‘state-dependent extension of EUT’, of which the present formalism is a first step.
We may say that the use of quantum probabilities helps clarifying how subjective probabilities are
formed. We indeed suggest that the kind of uncertainty that occurs in an ambiguity situation is similar
to the kind of uncertainty that occurs in quantum theory as an effect of superposition. It is important
to mention that the quantum theoretical approach allows reduction of ambiguity to risk, as subjective
probabilities can be estimated from quantum probabilities. However, this is a context-dependent risk
which cannot be modeled by Kolmogorovian probability. Rather, it is a ‘contextual risk’ that is modeled
in the mathematical formalism of quantum theory.
We put forward a non-Bayesian generalization of the Bayesian paradigm, where human decision-making
under uncertainty is modeled in the mathematical formalism of quantum theory, quantum states incor-
porate the uncertainty that is present in situations of ambiguity, and state transformations incorporate
people’s attitude towards ambiguity. This quantum-conceptual approach was recently employed with suc-
cess to model Ellsberg- and Machina-like preferences in the corresponding paradox situations, and to
faithfully represent data collected in experimental tests on the ‘three-color Ellsberg urn’ and the ‘Machina
reflection example’.
Let us summarize the content of this paper as follows.
In Section 3 we give an overview of the technical details of the mathematical formalism of quantum
theory that are needed to model cognitive entities, like ‘concepts’, ‘conceptual combinations’, or more com-
plex ‘DM entities’. We then apply in Section 3 the quantum conceptual approach to model the ‘disjunction
effect’, which entails a violation of one of the axioms of subjective EUT, the ‘sure thing principle’ (Tversky
& Shafir, 1992). Successively, we introduce in Section 4 the foundations of subjective EUT and briefly
review its non-Bayesian extensions. We explicitly present the Ellsberg paradox in the ‘three-color example’
and the Machina paradox in the ‘reflection example’. In Section 5 we instead work out a general quantum
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theoretical framework to represent events, states, measurements, subjective probabilities, acts and deci-
sions, which we apply to model the Ellsberg paradox (Section 5.1) and the Machina paradox (5.2). In
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 we also show that the quantum theoretical framework enables a faithful representation
of concrete experiments on the Ellbserg three-color example and the Machina reflection example, respec-
tively. We finally discuss in Section 6 some potential applications of the quantum theoretical approach to
model ambiguity and ambiguity aversion in economics and finance.
Before proceeding further, we would like to premise that the mathematical framework presented in
Section 5 is not derived from a representation theorem. It rather emerges from heuristic operational
considerations on events, measurements, outcomes and probabilities and their representation within the
formalism of quantum theory. And, indeed, it is able to reconstruct, via the quantum state of the DM
entity, the subjective probability distributions that are actualized in concrete experiments as a consequence
of a particular attitude toward ambiguity.
2 Fundamentals of quantum theoretical modeling
We illustrate in this section how the mathematical formalism of quantum theory can be applied to model
situations outside the microscopic quantum world, more specifically, in the representation of cognitive
entities. This formalism will be applied to conceptual entities in Section 3 and to decision-making (DM)
entities in Section 5. We avoid in our presentation superfluous technicalities, but aim to be synthetic and
rigorous at the same time.
When the quantum mechanical formalism is applied for modeling purposes, each considered entity – in
our case a cognitive entity – is associated with a complex Hilbert space H, that is, a vector space over the
field C of complex numbers, equipped with an inner product 〈·|·〉 that maps two vectors 〈A| and |B〉 onto
a complex number 〈A|B〉. We denote vectors by using the bra-ket notation introduced by Paul Adrien
Dirac, one of the pioneers of quantum theory (Dirac, 1958). Vectors can be ‘kets’, denoted by |A〉, |B〉, or
‘bras’, denoted by 〈A|, 〈B|. The inner product between the ket vectors |A〉 and |B〉, or the bra-vectors 〈A|
and 〈B|, is realized by juxtaposing the bra vector 〈A| and the ket vector |B〉, and 〈A|B〉 is also called a
‘bra-ket’, and it satisfies the following properties:
(i) 〈A|A〉 ≥ 0;
(ii) 〈A|B〉 = 〈B|A〉∗, where 〈B|A〉∗ is the complex conjugate of 〈A|B〉;
(iii) 〈A|(z|B〉 + t|C〉) = z〈A|B〉 + t〈A|C〉, for z, t ∈ C, where the sum vector z|B〉 + t|C〉 is called a
‘superposition’ of vectors |B〉 and |C〉 in the quantum jargon.
From (ii) and (iii) follows that the inner product 〈·|·〉 is linear in the ket and anti-linear in the bra, i.e.
(z〈A|+ t〈B|)|C〉 = z∗〈A|C〉+ t∗〈B|C〉.
We recall that the ‘absolute value’ of a complex number is defined as the square root of the product of
this complex number times its complex conjugate, that is, |z| = √z∗z. Moreover, a complex number z can
either be decomposed into its cartesian form z = x+iy, or into its polar form z = |z|eiθ = |z|(cos θ+i sin θ).
As a consequence, we have |〈A|B〉| =
√
〈A|B〉〈B|A〉. We define the ‘length’ of a ket (bra) vector |A〉 (〈A|)
as |||A〉|| = ||〈A||| = √〈A|A〉. A vector of unitary length is called a ‘unit vector’. We say that the ket
vectors |A〉 and |B〉 are ‘orthogonal’ and write |A〉 ⊥ |B〉 if 〈A|B〉 = 0.
We have now introduced the necessary mathematics to state the first modeling rule of quantum theory,
as follows.
First quantum modeling rule: A state A of an entity – in our case a cognitive entity – modeled by quantum
theory is represented by a ket vector |A〉 with length 1, that is 〈A|A〉 = 1.
An orthogonal projection M is a linear operator on the Hilbert space, that is, a mapping M : H →
H, |A〉 7→ M |A〉 which is Hermitian and idempotent. The latter means that, for every |A〉, |B〉 ∈ H and
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z, t ∈ C, we have:
(i) M(z|A〉 + t|B〉) = zM |A〉 + tM |B〉 (linearity);
(ii) 〈A|M |B〉 = 〈B|M |A〉∗ (hermiticity);
(iii) M ·M =M (idempotency).
The identity operator 1 maps each vector onto itself and is a trivial orthogonal projection operator.
We say that two orthogonal projections Mk and Ml are orthogonal operators if each vector contained in
the range Mk(H) is orthogonal to each vector contained in the range Ml(H), and we write Mk ⊥ Ml, in
this case. The orthogonality of the projection operators Mk and Ml can also be expressed by MkMl = 0,
where 0 is the null operator. A set of orthogonal projection operators {Mk | k = 1, . . . , n} is called a
‘spectral family’ if all projectors are mutually orthogonal, that is, Mk ⊥Ml for k 6= l, and their sum is the
identity, that is,
∑n
k=1Mk = 1. A spectral family {Mk | k = 1, . . . , n} identifies an Hermitian operator
Oˆ =
∑n
i=1 okMk, where ok is called ‘eigenvalue of Oˆ’, i.e. is a solution of the equation Oˆ|o〉 = ok|o〉 – the
non-null vectors satisfying this equation are called ‘eigenvectors of Oˆ’.
The above definitions give us the necessary mathematics to state the second modeling rule of quantum
theory, as follows.
Second quantum modeling rule: A measurable quantity Q of an entity – in our case a cognitive entity –
modeled by quantum theory, and having a set of possible real values {q1, . . . , qn} is represented by a spectral
family {Mk | k = 1, . . . , n}, equivalently, by the Hermitian operator Qˆ =
∑n
k=1 qkMk, in the following way.
If the conceptual entity is in a state represented by the vector |A〉, then the probability of obtaining the
value qk in a measurement of the measurable quantity Q is 〈A|Mk|A〉 = ||Mk|A〉||2. This formula is called
the ‘Born rule’ in the quantum jargon. Moreover, if the value qk is actually obtained in the measurement,
then the initial state is changed into a state represented by the vector
|Ak〉 = Mk|A〉||Mk|A〉|| (1)
This change of state is called ‘collapse’ in the quantum jargon.
Let us now come to the formalization of quantum probability. A major structural difference between
classical probability theory, which satisfies the axioms of Kolmogorov, and quantum probability theory,
which is non-Kolmogorovian, relies on the fact that the former is defined on a Boolean σ-algebra of
events, whilst the latter is defined on a more general algebraic structure. More specifically, let us denote
by L (H) the set of all orthogonal projection operators over the complex Hilbert space H. L (H) has
the algebraic properties of a complete orthocomplemented lattice, but L (H) is not distributive, hence
L (H) does not form a σ-algebra. A ‘generalized probability measure’ over L (H) is a function µ : M ∈
L (H) 7−→ µ(M) ∈ [0, 1], such that µ(1) = 1, and µ(∑∞k=1Mk) =∑∞k=1 µ(Mk), for any countable sequence
{Mk ∈ L (H) | k = 1, 2, . . .} of mutually orthogonal projection operators. The elements of L (H) are said
to represent ‘events’, in this framework. Referring to the definitions above, the event “a measurement of
the quantity Q gives the outcome qk” is represented by the orthogonal projection operator Mk.
The Born rule establishes a connection between states and generalized probability measures, as follows.
Given a state of a cognitive entity represented by the vector |A〉 ∈ H with length 1, it is possible to
associate |A〉 with a generalized probability measure µA over L (H), such that, for every M ∈ L (H),
µA(M) = 〈A|M |A〉. The generalized probability measure µA is a ‘quantum probability measure’ over
L (H). Interestingly enough, if the dimension of the Hilbert space is greater than 3, all generalized
probability measures over L (H) can be written as functions µA(M) = 〈A|M |A〉, for some unit vector
|A〉 ∈ H (Gleason theorem; Gleason, 1957).
The quantum theoretical modeling above can be extended by adding further quantum rules to model
compound cognitive entities and more general classes of measurements on cognitive entities. However, the
present definitions and results are sufficient to attain the results in this paper.
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3 The quantum cognition lesson
In 2002 Daniel Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Science for “having integrated insights
from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgement and decision-
making under uncertainty”.
Researchers have historically formalized human cognition and behavior by using set theoretical struc-
tures, mainly, Boolean logic and a probability theory that satisfies the axioms of Kolmogorov (Kolmogorov,
1933) (‘Kolmogorovian probability’). These are also called ‘classical structures’, as they were originally
employed in classical physics, and later extended to economics, finance, statistics, psychology, etc. As men-
tioned in Section 1, this conception has particularly flowed in economics into EUT to form the so-called
‘Bayesian paradigm’ and, with it, the roots of ‘rational behavior’.
However, since the beginning of the previous century, researchers have known that the probability
theory axiomatized by Kolmogorov is not the only way to talk about probabilities and uncertainty. Indeed,
quantum probability formalizes uncertainty into the microscopic realm (see, e.g., (Pitowsky, 1989)). A huge
amount of literature has discussed the conceptual differences between classical and quantum probability.
Leaving aside these differences, that are still object of scientific debate, we can certainly pin point the
structural differences between classical and quantum probabilistic theories. The former probability indeed
rests a normalized probability measure on a σ-algebra of events represented by sets and set theoretical
operations. The latter probability rests instead on a more abstract generalized measure on a lattice of
orthogonal projection operators over a complex Hilbert space (see Section 2).
What has become evident in the last three decades is that accumulating paradoxical findings in cognitive
psychology suggest that this classical conception of logic and probability theory is also fundamentally
problematical. Puzzling cognitive phenomena have been identified, revealing the so-called ‘fallacies of
human reasoning’, which can be roughly divided in two main classes, as follows.
(i) ‘Probability judgment errors’. People estimate the conjunction event ‘A and B’ (disjunction event
‘A or B’) as more (less) likely than the events A or/and B separately, which entails a violation of the
monotonicity law of Kolmogorovian probability.
(ii) ‘Decision-making errors’. People prefer action A over action B if they know that an event E occurs,
and also if they know that E does not occur, but they prefer B over A if they do not know whether E
occurs or not, which entails a violation of the total law of Kolmogorovian probability.
Fallacies of type (i) include the ‘conjunction’ and the ‘disjunction fallacy’, ‘non-monotonic reasoning’
and ‘over/under-extension effects’ in membership judgements in conceptual combinations, and violations of
distance axioms in similarity judgments. Fallacies of type (ii) include the ‘disjunction effect’ and violations
of the axioms of EUT (see, e.g, Busemeyer & Bruza (2012)), which we will extensively discuss in Section
4.
While a well established proposal of solution comes from the research programme on ‘individual heuris-
tics and bias’ developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1983, 1992), an alternative proposal has recently
grown which uses the mathematical formalism of quantum theory to model the observed deviations from
classicality in human reasoning. In particular, quantum probabilistic models have shown distinctive ad-
vantages over Bayesian models in representing experimental data on the fallacies above, also allowing to
make predictions and to discover new non-classical effects (see, e.g., the monographs Khrennikov, 2010;
Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; Haven & Khrennikov, 2013).
The origins of our quantum theoretical approach can be traced back to the studies on the structural
connections between cognitive and microphysical entities, namely, their behavior with respect to ‘con-
textuality’ and ‘pure potentiality’. We recognized that any decision process involves a ‘transition from
potential to actual’ in which an outcome is actualized from a set of possible outcomes as a consequence
of a contextual interaction (of a cognitive nature) between the decision-maker and the cognitive situation
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that is the object of the decision. Hence, human decision processes exhibit deep analogies with what occurs
in a quantum measurement process, where the measurement context (of a physical nature) influences the
measured quantum particle in a non-deterministic way. Quantum probability - which is able to formalize
this ‘contextually driven actualization of potential’, rather than classical probability, which only formalizes a
lack of knowledge about actuality - can conceptually and mathematically cope with this situation underlying
both quantum and cognitive realms (Aerts, 2009).
The above analysis was the starting point for the development of a quantum theoretical perspective
to represent conceptual entities and their combinations – conjunctions, disjunctions and negations (Aerts,
2009; Aerts, Gabora & Sozzo, 2013; Aerts, Broekaert, Gabora & Sozzo, 2013; Sozzo, 2015; Aerts, Sozzo &
Veloz, 2015). We modeled different sets of experimental data that exhibited deviations from classical logical
and Kolmogorovian structures, also identifying new non-classical mechanisms and extending the approach
to more complex decision-making situations (Sozzo, 2015; Aerts & Sozzo, 2016). A systematic treatment of
these results would lead us beyond the scope of the present paper. Hence, we limit ourselves to summarize
here a quantum theoretical modeling of the disjunction effect as an example of a long standing cognitive
puzzle. The solution offered here is paradigmatic, because the disjunction effect entails a violation of the
‘sure thing principle’, exactly like the paradoxes of subjective EUT mentioned in Section 1.
Savage stated the sure thing principle by means of the following story.
“A businessman contemplates buying a certain piece of property. He considers the outcome of the next
presidential election relevant. So, to clarify the matter to himself, he asks whether he would buy if he
knew that the Democratic candidate were going to win, and decides that he would. Similarly, he considers
whether he would buy if he knew that the Republican candidate were going to win, and again finds that
he would. Seeing that he would buy in either event, he decides that he should buy, even though he does
not know which event obtains, or will obtain, as we would ordinarily say.” (Savage, 1954).
Tversky and Shafir tested the sure thing principle in an experiment where they presented a group of
students with a ‘two-stage gamble’, that is, a gamble which can be played twice (Tversky & Shafir, 1992;
Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012). At each stage the decision consisted in whether or not playing a gamble that
has an equal chance of winning, say $200, or losing, say $100. The key result is based on the decision for
the second bet, after finishing the first bet. The experiment included three situations: (i) the students were
informed that they had already won the first gamble; (ii) the students were informed that they had lost
the first gamble; (iii) the students did not know the outcome of the first gamble. Tversky and Shafir found
that 69%, i.e. the majority, of the students who knew they had won the first gamble chose to play again,
59%, i.e. the majority, of the students who knew they had lost the first gamble, chose to play again; but
only 36% of the students who did not know whether they had won or lost chose to play again (equivalently,
64%, i.e. the majority, decided not to play in the second gamble).
The two-stage gamble experiment violates Savage’s sure thing principle: students generally prefer to
play again if they know they won, and they also prefer to play again if they know they lost, but they
generally prefer not to play again when they do not know whether they won or lost. More generally, the
experiment performed by Tversky and Shafir violates the total law of Kolmogorovian probability. If we
denote by µ(P ) the total probability that a student decides to play again without knowing whether he/she
has won or lost in the first gamble, by µ(W ) and µ(L) the probability that the student wins or loses,
respectively, by µ(P |W ) the conditional probability that the student decides to play again when he/she
knows he/she has won, and by µ(P |L) the conditional probability that the student decides to play again
when he/she knows he/she has lost, then it is not possible to find any value of µ(W ) and µ(L) = 1−µ(W )
such that µ(P |W ) = 0.69 and µ(P |L) = 0.59, p(P ) = 0.36 and the law of total probability
µ(P ) = µ(W )µ(P |W ) + µ(L)µ(P |L) (2)
is satisfied. This violation of the laws of Kolmogorovian probability is called the ‘disjunction effect’.
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An equivalent formulation of the disjunction effect is known as the ‘Hawaii problem’, and it is again
due to Tversky and Shafir (1992). Consider the following situations.
‘Disjunctive version’. Imagine that you have just taken a tough qualifying examination. It is the end of
the fall quarter, you feel tired and run-down, and you are not sure that you passed the exam. In case you
failed you have to take the exam again in a couple of months after the Christmas holidays. You now have
an opportunity to buy a very attractive 5-day Christmas vacation package to Hawaii at an exceptionally
low price. The special offer expires tomorrow, while the exam grade will not be available until the following
day. Would you: x buy the vacation package; y not buy the vacation package; z pay a $5 non-refundable
fee in order to retain the rights to buy the vacation package at the same exceptional price the day after
tomorrow after you find out whether or not you passed the exam?
‘Pass/fail version’. Imagine that you have just taken a tough qualifying examination. It is the end
of the fall quarter, you feel tired and run-down, and you find out that you passed the exam (failed the
exam. You will have to take it again in a couple of months after the Christmas holidays). You now have
an opportunity to buy a very attractive 5-day Christmas vacation package to Hawaii at an exceptionally
low price. The special offer expires tomorrow. Would you: x buy the vacation package; y not buy the
vacation package: z pay a $5 non-refundable fee in order to retain the rights to buy the vacation package
at the same exceptional price the day after tomorrow.
In the Hawaii experiment, Tversky and Shafir experienced the same pattern of the two-stage gamble
situation. Indeed, more than half of the subjects chose option x (buy the vacation package) if they knew
the outcome of the exam (54% in the pass condition and 57% in the fail condition), whereas only 32% chose
option x (buy the vacation package) if they did not know the outcome of the exam. The Hawaii problem
clearly shows a violation of the sure thing principle: subjects generally prefer option x (buy the vacation
package) when they know that they passed the exam, and they also prefer x when they know that they
failed the exam, but they refuse x (or prefer z) when they don’t know whether they passed or failed the
exam. Moreover, as in the two-stage gamble experiment, the Hawaii problem also violates the total law of
Komogorovian probability.
A seemingly plausible explanation is that the origin of the violation of the sure thing principle in the
disjunction effect is ‘uncertainty aversion’, that is, people prefer to buy the vacation package in both cases
where they have certainty about the outcome of the exam, while they refuse to buy the package when they
do not yet know whether they passed or failed the exam and hence lack this certainty. We will come back
to this when studying ‘ambiguity aversion’ in Section 4.
We now work out a quantum theoretical model for these two experiments, where the above mentioned
deviation is described in terms of genuine quantum effects.
Let us firstly consider the Hawaii problem and denote by A the conceptual situation in which the
participant has passed the exam, and by B the conceptual situation in which the participant has failed the
exam. The disjunction of both conceptual situations, denoted by ‘A or B’, is the conceptual situation in
which the participant ‘has passed or failed the exam’. The participant has to make a decision whether to
buy the vacation package – positive outcome, or not to buy it – negative outcome.
We introduce the notion of state of a conceptual entity, as in Section 2. Thus, each conceptual situation
above is described by a defined state and represented by a unit vector of a complex Hilbert space. More
explicitly, we represent A by the unit vector |A〉 and B by the unit vector |B〉 in a complex Hilbert space.
We assume that |A〉 and |B〉 are orthogonal, that is, 〈A|B〉 = 0, and represent the disjunction ‘A or B’
by means of the normalized superposition state vector 1√
2
(|A〉 + |B〉). The decision to be made is ‘to buy
the vacation package’ or ‘not to buy the vacation package’. This decision is represented by an orthogonal
projection operator M of the Hilbert space H in our modeling scheme. The probability of the outcome
‘yes’, i.e. ‘buy the package’, in the ‘pass’ situation, i.e. state vector |A〉, is 0.54, and we denote it by
µ(A) = 0.54. The probability of the outcome ‘yes’, i.e. buy the package, in the ‘fail’ situation, i.e. state
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vector |B〉, is 0.57, and we denote it by µ(B) = 0.57. The probability of the outcome ‘yes’, i.e. buy
the package, in the ‘pass or fail’ situation, i.e. state vector 1√
2
(|A〉 + |B〉), is 0.32, and we denote it by
µ(A or B) = 0.32.
In accordance with quantum probability rules in Section 2, we have
µ(A) = 〈A|M |A〉 (3)
µ(B) = 〈B|M |B〉 (4)
µ(A or B) =
1
2
(〈A|+ 〈B|)M(|A〉 + |B〉) (5)
By applying the linearity of the Hilbert space and the hermiticity of M , that is, 〈B|M |A〉∗ = 〈A|M |B〉,
we then get
µ(A or B) =
1
2
(〈A|M |A〉 + 〈A|M |B〉+ 〈B|M |A〉+ 〈B|M |B〉)
=
µ(A) + µ(B)
2
+ Re(〈A|M |B〉) (6)
where Re(〈A|M |B〉) is the real part of the complex number 〈A|M |B〉, i.e. the typical interference term of
quantum theory. Its presence allows to produce a deviation from the average value 12(µ(A) +µ(B)), which
would be the outcome in the absence of interference. Note that, also in this disjunction effect situation,
we have applied two key quantum features, namely, ‘superposition’, in taking 1√
2
(|A〉 + |B〉) to represent
‘A or B’, and ‘interference’, as the effect appearing in (6).
Our quantum model can be realized in the three-dimensional complex Hilbert space C3 (Aerts, 2009;
Sozzo, 2015), as follows. Let us distinguish two cases:
(i) if µ(A) + µ(B) ≤ 1, we put a(A) = 1− µ(A), b(B) = 1− µ(B) and γ = pi;
(ii) if µ(A) + µ(B) > 1, we put a(A) = µ(A), b(B) = µ(B) and γ = 0.
Moreover, we choose
|A〉 = (
√
a(A), 0,
√
1− a(A)) (7)
|B〉 =
{
ei(β+γ)
(√
(1−a(A))(1−b(B))
a(A) ,
√
a(A)+b(B)−1
a(A) ,−
√
1− b(B)
)
if a(A) 6= 0
eiβ(0, 1, 0) if a(A) = 0
(8)
β =
{
arccos
(
2µ(A or B)−µ(A)−µ(B)
2
√
(1−a(A))(1−b(B))
)
if a(A) 6= 1, b(B) 6= 1
arbitrary if a(A) = 1 or b(B) = 1
(9)
If µ(A) + µ(B) ≤ 1, we take M to project orthogonally onto the subspace of C3 spanned by the vector
(0, 0, 1). If µ(A) + µ(B) > 1, we take M to project orthogonally onto the subspace of C3 spanned by the
vectors (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0).
One can verify that this construction gives rise to a quantum mechanical representation of the Hawaii
problem situation with probabilities µ(A), µ(B) and µ(A or B). In particular, the interference term in (6)
is given by
Re(〈A|M |B〉) =
√
(1− a(A))(1 − b(B)) cosβ (10)
where β is the ‘interference angle for the disjunction’.
Equations (6) and (10) can be used to represent the Hawaii problem situation. If we set µ(A) = 0.54,
µ(B) = 0.57 and µ(A or B) = 0.32, and observe that µ(A) + µ(B) = 1.11 > 1, then we have a(A) = 0.54,
b(B) = 0.57 and γ = 0. After making the calculations of (7), (8) and (9), we obtain |A〉 = (0.73, 0, 0.68),
|B〉 = ei121.90◦(0.61, 0.45,−0.66) and we take M to project onto the subspace of C3 spanned by the vectors
(1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0). One verifies at once that this model indeed yields the correct numerical outcomes.
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Let us now come to the two-stage gamble situation. Here, we have µ(A) = 0.69, µ(B) = 0.59 and
µ(A or B) = 0.36, hence µ(A) + µ(B) = 1.28 > 1, a(A) = 0.69, b(B) = 0.59 and γ = 0. Equations (6)
and (10) can be solved for β = 141.76◦. In addition, (7), (8) and (9) can be solved for |A〉 = (0.83, 0, 0.56),
|B〉 = ei141.76◦(0.43, 0.64,−0.64) and M(C3) is the subspace of C3 spanned by vectors (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0).
Also in this case, one easily verifies that our quantum model yields the correct numerical outcomes.
We have thus provided a quantum model which successfully represents the disjunction effect occurring
in the experiments by Tversky and Shafir (1992). It is important to observe that the observed deviations
from Kolmogorovian probability are not interpreted in this approach as biases of human mind but, rather,
as expressions of genuine quantum effects, namely, contextuality, emergence interference and superposition.
It is also worth noticing the fundamental role that complex numbers play in our construction, since they
make it possible to have a non-null interference term in (6).
The treatment of the disjunction effect above constitutes a relevant example of quantum modeling of
cognitive entities, states, measurements, probabilities and decisions. In the next sections, we will extend
this treatment to more complex decision-making situations.
4 Expected utility theory and its pitfalls
Researchers in probability theory distinguish between probabilities that are known, or knowable, e.g.,
from past data, which they call ‘objective probabilities’, and probabilities that are not known nor can be
deduced, calculated or estimated in an objective way. For this reason, Knight introduced the term ‘risk’
to designate situations that can be described by objective probabilities, and ‘uncertainty’ to designate
situations that cannot be described by objective probabilities (Knight, 1921).1 The Bayesian paradigm
mentioned in Section 1 minimizes this distinction by introducing the notion of ‘subjective probability’:
even when the probabilities are not known, people may form their own ‘beliefs’, or ‘priors’, thus reducing
problems of decision under ambiguity to problems of decision under risk. Within the Bayesian paradigm,
people then update their beliefs according to the Bayes rule of Kolmogorovian probability.
The predominant model of choice under risk, i.e. in the presence of objective probabilities, is the
EUT elaborated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), which we call
‘objective EUT’. Von Neumann and Morgenstern presented a set of axioms allowing to uniquely represent
human preferences over ‘lotteries’ by maximization of the expected utility functional. The reasonability
of their axioms is so widely accepted that these axioms constitute the ‘normative counterpart of rational
behavior’. However, the ‘Allais paradox’ revealed that simple situations exist where decision-makers violate
some axioms of objective EUT (Allais, 1953). In addition, the von Neumann-Morgenstern framework does
not apply to problems where objective probabilities are not given. For this reason, Savage extended EUT
to subjective probabilities within the Bayesian paradigm above: decision-makers behave as if they had
subjective probabilities with respect to which they maximize expected utility (Savage, 1954).
We illustrate in the following the main definitions and results of ‘subjective EUT’. While other elegant
formulations of subjective EUT have been widely used in the literature, like the ‘Anscombe-Aumann’
(Anscombe & Aumann, 1963), or the ‘Fishburn’ (Fishburn, 1970) formulation, we prefer presenting the
Savage original formulation, as it will be naturally extended in Section 5. As in Section 2, we try to be
rigorous, without however dwelling on mathematical technicalities.
Our basic mathematical framework requires a set S = {. . . , s, . . .} of states of nature. A Boolean
σ-algebra of subsets of S is denoted by A ⊆ P(S ) (P(S ) is the power set of S ), while the elements of
1We prefer using the the term ‘ambiguity’ when referring to situations involving unknown probabilities, as done in many
textbooks and papers on the topic.
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Act Red Yellow Black
f1 $100 $0 $0
f2 $0 $0 $100
f3 $100 $100 $0
f4 $0 $100 $100
Table 1. The payoff matrix for the Ellsberg three-color thought experiment.
A denote events. A probability measure µ : A ⊆ P(S ) −→ [0, 1] over A is such that, for every E ∈ A ,
µ(E) =
∫
E
dµ(s) (11)
Then, we denote by X the set of consequences. For our purposes, it is sufficient that the elements x ∈ X
are monetary payoffs, so that x belongs to the real line ℜ. A decision-maker is assumed to have preferences
over acts. An act is a function f : s ∈ S 7−→ f(s) ∈ X , and we denote by F the set of all acts. Then,
one assumes a weak order (i.e. reflexive, symmetric and transitive) relation % on the Cartesian product
F ×F , and one introduces a utility function u : X −→ ℜ.
Savage proved that, if one assumes that the preference relation % satisfies a number of axioms (including
the sure thing principle), then, a probability measure µ : A ⊆ P(S ) −→ [0, 1] and a function u : X −→ ℜ
exist such that, for every f, g ∈ F ,
f % g iff
∫
S
u(f(s))dµ(s) ≥
∫
S
u(g(s))dµ(s) (12)
The integrals in (12) express the expected utility functionals W (f) and W (g) associated with the acts
f and g, respectively. The probability measure µ is interpreted as a subjective probability measure and
represents the decision-maker’s beliefs, while u is a utility function and represents the decision-maker’s
taste. In addition, µ is unique and u is uniquely defined up to a positive affine transformation (see,
e.g., Etner, Jeleva & Tallon, 2012; Gilboa & Marinacci, 2013; Karni, 2014). As in the von Neumann-
Morgenstern formulation, the concavity of u is a measure of the decision-maker’s risk aversion (for given
beliefs). Deriving both probability and utility from observed choices, Savage was able to give both a
normative and descriptive status to his subjective EUT. It is however important, at this stage, to stress
that the probability distribution µ is unique and satisfies the axioms of Kolmogorovian probability theory,
in agreement with the Bayesian paradigm.
Subjective EUT has been widely applied to economics and finance. However, in many economic prob-
lems of interest it is not clear how one should define probabilities and, if the latter cannot be defined in
a satisfactory way, how people form beliefs. In addition, in a seminal 1961 paper, Ellsberg predicted in
his ‘two-color example’ that people do not always choose by maximizing their subjective expected util-
ity, but they generally prefer acts over events with known (or objective) probabilities to acts over events
with unknown (or subjective) probabilities, a phenomenon called ‘ambiguity aversion’ (Ellsberg, 1961).
Interestingly enough, the explanation proposed by Ellsberg for the observed pattern closely resembles the
‘uncertainty aversion’ proposed by Tversky and Shafir for the disjunction effect (see Section 3).
The thought experiment where ambiguity aversion manifestly clashes with subjective EUT is the ‘three-
color example’.
Consider one urn with 30 red balls and 60 balls that are either yellow or black in unknown proportion.
One ball will be drawn at random from the urn. Then, free of charge, a person is asked to bet on one of the
acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 defined in Table 1. Ellsberg suggested that, when asked to rank these acts, most of
the persons will prefer f1 over f2 and f4 over f3. On the other hand, acts f1 and f4 are ‘unambiguous’, as
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they are associated with events over known probabilities, while acts f2 and f3 are ‘ambiguous’, as they are
associated with events over unknown probabilities. The conclusion is that people prefer the unambiguous
act over its ambiguous counterpart. There is a huge experimental evidence that decision-makers actually
show this ambiguity aversion (see, e.g., the extensive review by Machina and Siniscalchi (2014)). Only the
experiment by Slovic and Tversky (1974) indicated that ‘ambiguity attraction’ was at play, while more
recent experiments identify other behavioral mechanisms as primary (Binmore, Stewart & Voorhoeve,
2012).
Neither ambiguity aversion nor ambiguity attraction can be explained within subjective EUT, as they
violate the sure thing principle, according to which, preferences should be independent of the common
outcome. For example, in the three-color urn, preferences should not depend on whether the common
event “a yellow ball is drawn” pays off $0 or $100. More technically, subjective EUT predicts ‘consistency
of decision-makers’ preferences’, that is, f1 is preferred to f2 if and only if f3 is preferred to f4. A simple
calculation shows that this is impossible. Indeed, if we denote by pR, pY and pB the subjective probability
that a red ball, a yellow ball, a black ball, respectively, is drawn (with pR = 1/3 = 1− (pY + pB)), then the
expected utilitiesW (fi), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, are such thatW (f1) > W (f2) if and only if (pR−pB)(u(100)−u(0)) >
0 if and only if W (f3) > W (f4). Hence, no assignment of the subjective probabilities pR, pY and pB
reproduces a preference with W (f1) > W (f2) and W (f4) > W (f3).
In the last forty years various extensions of subjective EUT have been elaborated, mainly in an ax-
iomatic form, to cope with the Ellsberg paradox and ambiguity aversion. These proposals weaken some
of the axioms of subjective EUT, e.g., the sure thing principle, taking a non-Bayesian direction. Without
pretending to be exhaustive (extensive reviews can be found in, e.g., Gilboa & Marinacci (2013), Etner,
Jelena & Tallon (2012) and Machina & Siniscalchi (2014)), we can roughly group these alternative decision
models as follows.
(i) ‘Type-I models’ include ‘Choquet expected utility’ (Schmeidler, 1989) and ‘cumulative prospect
theory’ (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1992). These models assume ‘non-additive capacities’, rather than
Kolmogorovian probabilities, to represent beliefs. In particular, Choquet expected utility introduces rank-
dependent axioms.
(ii) ‘Type-II models’ include ‘max-min expected utility’ (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989) and ‘α-max min
expected utility‘ (Ghirardato, Maccheroni & Marinacci, 2004). These models rest on the insight that, in
the absence of relevant information, asking for precise subjective beliefs is too demanding. Hence, these
models assume a set of probability distributions, or ‘multiple priors’, underlying actual decisions.
(iii) ‘Type-III models’ include ‘variational preference’ (Maccheroni, Marinacci & Rustichini, 2006) and
‘robust control’ (Hansen & Sargent, 2001). These models assume that the decision-maker has a benchmark
probability distribution in mind, but he/she is not ‘completely confident’ about it.
(iv) ‘Type-IV models’ include ‘smooth ambiguity preferences’ (Klibanoff, Marinacci & Mukerij, 2005).
These models still assume that the decision-maker has a set of priors, but in a concrete decision, he/she
also comes up with a prior over this set of priors, or ‘second order belief’.
The proposals above successfully cope with the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes and, though some of them
have been criticized (Epstein, 1999), they have manifold applications in economic and financial modeling.
More important, they depart from the assumption that only Kolmogorovian probabilities can represent
subjective beliefs, but they, more or less explicitly, assume non-Kolmogorovian probability distributions.
In 2009 Mark Machina proposed new thought experiments, which seriously challenge existing results on
EUT, the ‘50:51 example’ and the ‘reflection example’ (Machina, 2009). Like Machina and other scholars
have proved, the decision models above are incompatible with the choices expected in these two examples
(Machina, 2009; Baillon, l’Haridon & Placido, 2011). In particular, the reflection example questions an
axiom of Choquet expected utility, the so-called ‘tail separability’, exactly as the Ellsberg three-color
example questions the sure thing principle of subjective EUT.
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Act Red Yellow Black Green
f1 $0 $50 $25 $25
f2 $0 $25 $50 $25
f3 $25 $50 $25 $0
f4 $25 $25 $50 $0
Table 2. The payoff matrix for the Machina reflection example with lower tail shifts.
Act Red Yellow Black Green
f1 $50 $50 $25 $75
f2 $50 $25 $50 $75
f3 $75 $50 $25 $50
f4 $75 $25 $50 $50
Table 3. The payoff matrix for the Machina reflection example with upper tail shifts.
We present here two versions of the reflection example, as in l’Haridon & Placido (2010).
Reflection example with lower tail shifts. Consider one urn with 20 balls, 10 are either red or yellow
in unknown proportion, 10 are either black or green in unknown proportion. One ball will be drawn at
random from the urn. Then, free of charge, a person is asked to bet on one of the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4
defined in Table 2. Machina introduced the notion of ‘informational symmetry’, namely, the events “the
drawn ball is red or yellow” and “the drawn ball is black or green” have known and equal probability and,
further, the ambiguity about the distribution of colors is similar in the two events. In an informational
symmetry scenario, people should prefer act f1 over act f2 and act f4 over act f3, or they should prefer
act f2 over act f1 and act f3 over act f4. On the other hand, let us introduce the utilities u(0), u(25) and
u(50), the subjective probabilities pR, pY , pB and pG, and calculate the expected utilities W (fi) of the acts
fi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Then, we have that preferences should be consistent according to subjective EUT, namely,
W (f1) > W (f2) if and only if (u(50)− u(25))(pY − pB) > 0 if and only if W (f3) > W (f4). The interesting
aspect of this example is that Choquet expected utility predicts similar consistency requirements on the
basis of tail separability.
An experiment by L’Haridon and Placido (2010) confirms the Machina preference f1 % f2 and f4 % f3,
consistently with informational symmetry. We will illustrate in detail the experiment in Section 5.2, where
we will represent it within our general quantum theoretical modeling.
Reflection example with upper tail shifts. Consider one urn with 20 balls, 10 are either red or yellow
in unknown proportion, 10 are either black or green in unknown proportion. One ball will be drawn at
random from the urn. Then, free of charge, a person is asked to bet on one of the acts f1, f2, f3 and
f4 defined in Table 3. According to Machina’s informational symmetry, people should again prefer act f1
over act f2 and act f4 over act f3, or they should prefer act f2 over act f1 and act f3 over act f4. On
the other hand, let us introduce the utilities u(25), u(50) and u(75), the subjective probabilities pR, pY ,
pB and pG, and calculate the expected utilities W (fi) of the acts fi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Then, we have that
preferences should again be consistent according to subjective EUT, namely, W (f1) > W (f2) if and only
if (u(50)−u(25))(pY − pB) > 0 if and only if W (f3) > W (f4). One shows that tail separability of Choquet
expected utility leads to a similar prediction.
The experiment by L’Haridon and Placido (2010) confirms again the Machina preference f1 % f2 and
f4 % f3, consistently with informational symmetry, and its results will be reviewed in Section 5.2.
The theoretical and experimental arguments above strongly require a novel approach to ambiguity. As
mentioned in Section 1, a possible way out of these difficulties is assuming non-Kolmogorovian probability
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distributions to represent subjective beliefs. Following our considerations in Section 3, we believe that
quantum probability distribution is a proper candidate to represent the uncertainty surrounding decision-
making situations.
5 A theoretical framework to represent preferences
Inspired by the cognitive approach in Section 3, we have recently worked out a quantum theoretical
framework to model the Ellsberg and Machina paradox situations (Aerts, Sozzo & Tapia, 2012; 2014). We
have also successfully represented data collected on the three-color Ellsberg (Aerts, Sozzo & Tapia, 2014)
and Machina reflection (L’Haridon & Placido, 2010) experiments within the quantum framework (Aerts &
Sozzo, 2016). In this section we generalize these results by presenting a unified perspective to model events,
states, subjective probabilities, acts, preferences and decisions within the quantum mechanical formalism.
This can be considered as a first step toward the elaboration of ‘state dependent EUT’ where subjective
probabilities are represented by quantum probabilities, and attitudes toward ambiguity are incorporated
into the states of the cognitive entities.
We begin with the introduction of some basic notions and definitions that are needed to operationally
describe the cognitive aspects of decision-making under uncertainty, following the approach in Section 3.
(i) The cognitive situation that is the object of the decision identifies a DM entity in a defined state
pv. We denote by ΣDM the set of all possible states of the DM entity. This state has a cognitive nature,
hence it should be distinguished from a physical state or a state of nature (see Section 4). The cognitive
state mathematically captures aspects of ambiguity.
(ii) There is a contextual interaction of a cognitive, not physical, nature between the decision-maker
and the DM entity. This contextual interaction determines a change of the state of the DM entity. The
way in which this change occurs depends on subjective attitudes toward ambiguity (ambiguity aversion,
ambiguity attraction, etc.).
(iii) Events correspond to measurements that can be performed on the DM entity. For each state pv
of the DM entity, each event E is associated with a probability µv(E) that the event occurs when the DM
entity is in the state pv.
(iv) The DM entity, its states, events, probabilities and the decision-making process are modeled by
using the mathematical formalism of quantum theory in Section 2. In particular, the state of the DM
entity identifies a single quantum probability distribution via the Born rule. We interpret this quantum
probability distribution, which is generally non-Kolmogorovian, as the subjective probability distribution
associated with the specific DM process.
Let us start with the simple case where the set S of states of nature is finite and let {E1, E2, . . . , En}
be a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive elementary events, which form a partition of S . We denote
by X the set of consequences, and suppose that X contains monetary outcomes, for the sake of simplicity.
An act is defined as a function f : S −→ X , and we denote the set of acts by F . If the act f maps
the elementary event Ei into the outcome xi ∈ ℜ, then we can equivalently define f by the 2n-tuple
(E1, x1; . . . ;En, xn). We assume that a utility function u : X −→ ℜ exists over the set of consequences
which incorporates individual preferences toward risk.
We refer to the mathematics introduced in Section 2. The DM entity is associated with a Hilbert
space H over the field C of complex numbers. Since n is the number of elementary events, the space H
can be chosen to be isomorphic to the Hilbert space Cn of n-ples of complex numbers. We thus denote
by {|α1〉, |α2〉, . . . , |αn〉} the canonical orthonormal (ON) basis of Cn, that is, |α1〉 = (1, 0, . . . 0), . . . ,
|αn〉 = (0, 0, . . . n). The event Ei is then represented by the orthogonal projection operator Pi = |αi〉〈αi|,
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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For every state pv ∈ ΣDM of the DM entity, represented by the unit vector |v〉 =
∑n
i=1〈αi|v〉|αi〉 ∈ Cn,
the quantum probability distribution
µv : P ∈ L (Cn) 7−→ µv(P ) ∈ [0, 1] (13)
(L (Cn) is the lattice of all orthogonal projection operators over the complex Hilbert space Cn) induced
by the Born rule, associates the probability that the event E, represented by the orthogonal projection
operator P , occurs when the DM entity is in the state pv. Thus, in particular,
µv(Ei) = 〈v|Pi|v〉 = |〈αi|v〉|2 (14)
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Suppose that, when the decision-maker is presented with a choice between the acts f and g, the DM
entity is in the initial state pv0 . This state is interpreted as the state of the DM entity when no cognitive
context is present. As the decision-maker starts pondering between f and g, this mental action can be
described as a cognitive context interacting with the DM entity and changing its state. The type of state
change directly depends on the decision-maker’s attitude toward ambiguity. More precisely, if the DM
entity is in the initial state pv0 and the decision-maker is asked to choose between the acts f and g, a given
attitude toward ambiguity, say ambiguity aversion, will determine a given change of state of the DM entity
to a state pv, leading the decision-maker to prefer, say f to g. But, a different attitude toward ambiguity
will determine a different change of state of the DM entity to a state pw, leading the decision-maker to
prefer g to f . In this way, different attitudes toward ambiguity are formalized by different changes of state
inducing different subjective probabilities.
The considerations above suggest associating the DM entity with a ‘family of subjective probability
distributions’ {µv : L (Cn) −→ [0, 1] | pv ∈ ΣDM}, represented by quantum probabilities and parametrized
by the state of the DM entity. In a concrete choice between two acts we will derive the exact state, hence
the specific subjective probability distribution that represents the actual choice.
Let us now come to the representation of acts. The act f = (E1, x1; . . . ;En, xn) is represented by the
Hermitian operator
Fˆ =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)Pi =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)|αi〉〈αi| (15)
For every pv ∈ ΣDM , we introduce the functional ‘expected utility in the state pv’Wv : F −→ ℜ as follows.
For every f ∈ F ,
Wv(f) = 〈v|Fˆ |v〉 = 〈v|
( n∑
i=1
u(xi)Pi
)
|v〉 =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)〈v|Pi|v〉 =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)|〈αi|v〉|2 =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)µv(Ei) (16)
because of (14) and (15). Equation (16) generalizes the expected utility formula of subjective EUT. As
we can see, expected utility explicitly depends on the state pv of the DM entity. This means that, for two
acts f and g, two states pv and pw may exist such that Wv(f) > Wv(g), but Ww(f) < Ww(g), depending
on subjective attitudes toward ambiguity. This suggests introducing a state-dependent preference relation
%v on the set of acts F , as follows.
For every f, g ∈ F , pv ∈ ΣDM ,
f %v g iff Wv(f) ≥Wv(g) (17)
It follows that the DM entity incorporates the presence of ambiguity, as the quantum probability dis-
tribution representing subjective probabilities depends on the state of the DM entity. Furthermore, the
way in which the state of the DM entity changes in the interaction with the decision-maker incorporates
people’s attitude toward ambiguity, as it determines the state-dependent preference relation %v. The state-
dependence enables the ‘inversion of preferences’ observed in the Ellsberg and Machina paradox situations,
as will become evident from the next sections.
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5.1 Application to the Ellsberg three-color urn
Let us now consider the Ellsberg three-color example and represent it by using the formalism in Section 5.
The DM entity, which we call the ‘Ellsberg entity’, is a cognitive representation of the urn with 30 red
balls and 60 yellow and black balls in unknown proportion. Let us point out explicitly that the ‘Ellsberg
entity’ is ‘not’ the physical entity of the urn with 30 red balls and 60 yellow and black balls. We can
also easily understand that it cannot be, because for the physical entity the proportion of black balls and
yellow balls ‘is’ always determined. Thus, if we specify in our description of the Ellsberg situation that this
proportion is unknown we bring in explicitly a cognitive element, which makes the Ellsberg entity, i.e. the
entity experimented upon, a cognitive entity and no longer a physical entity. One can wonder whether this
cognitive aspect which render the Ellsberg entity from a physical entity into a cognitive entity is not just
a subjective element which can be recuperated in the notion of subjective probability. It is not, at least
not if subjective probabilities are meant to describe the subjectiveness pertained to the person performing
the Ellsberg test. Indeed, the specification of the proportion of black balls and yellow balls to be unknown
is presented each time again to each different participant when the test is performed, and hence cannot
be attributed to the subjectivity of one individual test participant. It is objectively part of the beginning
experimental situation that each person is confronted with in an experiment, and this is the reason it
pertains to the cognitive representation of the Ellsberg physical entity which is indeed the ‘object’ of the
test. The above reasoning clarifies why we introduce the notion of ‘state’ to describe it. Hence, the state
pv of the Ellsberg entity exactly describes the cognitive situation of the urn with 30 red balls and 60 yellow
and black balls in unknown proportion. However, many states of the Ellsberg entity are possible if we,
for example, also specify something more than just ‘unknown proportion’ about yellow and black balls, in
which case the cognitive situation is described by a different state. We represent each state pv by the unit
vector |v〉 of the complex Hilbert space C3 over complex numbers.2 We denote by (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and
(0, 0, 1) the unit vectors of the canonical basis of C3.
Let us now consider the elementary, exhaustive and mutually exclusive events ER: “a red ball is drawn”,
EY : “a yellow ball is drawn”, and EB : “a black ball is drawn”. They define a ‘color measurement’ on the
Ellsberg entity. This color measurement has three outcomes, corresponding to the three colors red, yellow
and black, and it is represented by a Hermitian operator with eigenvectors |R〉 = (1, 0, 0), |Y 〉 = (0, 1, 0),
and |B〉 = (0, 0, 1) or, equivalently, by the spectral family {Pi = |i〉〈i| | i = R,Y,B}. In other terms, the
event Ei is represented by the orthogonal projection operator Pi = |i〉〈i|, i = R,Y,B. In the canonical
basis of C3, a state pv of the Ellsberg entity is represented by the unit vector
|v〉 = ρReiθR |R〉+ ρY eiθY |Y 〉+ ρBeiθB |B〉 = (ρReiθR , ρY eiθY , ρBeiθB ) (18)
By using the Born rule of quantum probability, the probability µv(Ei) of drawing a ball of color i, i =
R,Y,B, when the Ellsberg entity is in a state pv, is given by
µv(Ei) = 〈v|Pi|v〉 = |〈i|v〉|2 = ρ2i (19)
We have ρ2R = 1/3, as the urn contains 30 red balls. Therefore, a state pv of the Ellsberg entity is
represented by the unit vector
|v〉 = ( 1√
3
eiθR , ρY e
iθY ,
√
2
3
− ρ2Y eiθB ) (20)
2As mentioned in Section 5, the choice of C3 depends on the fact that there are three mutually exclusive and exhaustive
events in the three-color example – the generalization to the Ellsberg n-color example is straightforward.
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Let us now introduce two specific states pRY and pRB of the Ellsberg entity. The states pRY and pRB are
represented by the unit vectors
|vRY 〉 = ( 1√
3
eiθR ,
√
2
3
eiθY , 0) (21)
and
|vRB〉 = ( 1√
3
eiθR , 0,
√
2
3
eiθB ) (22)
and describe the cognitive situation “there are no black balls” and “there are no yellow balls”, respectively.
As the Ellsberg entity is a cognitive entity, ‘cognitive contexts’ have an influence on its state, and in
general will make a specific state change into another state. This is what happens in the cognitive realm
in analogy with the physical realm, where a physical context will in general change the physical state of a
physical entity. Hence, whenever a decision-maker is asked to ponder between the choice of f1 and f2, the
pondering itself, before a choice is made, is a cognitive context, and hence it changes in general the state of
the Ellsberg entity. Similarly, whenever a decision-maker is asked to ponder between the choice of f3 and
f4, also this introduces a cognitive context, before the choice is made – and a context which in general is
different from the one introduced by pondering about the choice between f1 and f2 – which will in general
change the state of the Ellsberg entity.
Let us now introduce a state p0 describing the situation where no cognitive context is present. This
is the initial state of the Ellsberg entity, and symmetry reasons suggest to represent it by the unit vector
|v0〉 = 1√3(1, 1, 1). Then, a pondering about the choice between f1 and f2 will make the state p0 of the
Ellsberg entity change to a state pw1 that is generally different from the state pw2 in which the Ellsberg
entity changes from p0 when pondering about a choice between f3 and f4. In particular, a ‘highly ambiguity
averse’ decision-maker will be, as a consequence of her/his pondering in the choice between f1 and f2,
confronted with the Ellsberg entity which changes from the initial state p0 to a state pw1 that is very close
to the state pRY represented in (21). Analogously, a ‘highly ambiguity averse’ decision-maker will be, as
a consequence of her/his pondering in the choice between f3 and f4, confronted with the Ellsberg entity
which changes from the state p0 to a state pw2 that is very close to the state pRB represented in (22).
Let us then come to the representation of the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 in Table 1, Section 4. For a given
utility function u, to be estimated from empirical data, we respectively associate f1, f2, f3 and f4 with the
Hermitian operators
Fˆ1 = u(100)PR + u(0)PY + u(0)PB (23)
Fˆ2 = u(0)PR + u(0)PY + u(100)PB (24)
Fˆ3 = u(100)PR + u(100)PY + u(0)PB (25)
Fˆ4 = u(0)PR + u(100)PY + u(100)PB (26)
The corresponding expected utilities in a state pv of the Ellsberg entity are
Wv(f1) = 〈v|Fˆ1|v〉 = 1
3
u(100) +
2
3
u(0) (27)
Wv(f2) = 〈v|Fˆ2|v〉 = (1
3
+ ρ2Y )u(0) + (
2
3
− ρ2Y )u(100) (28)
Wv(f3) = 〈v|Fˆ3|v〉 = (1
3
+ ρ2Y )u(100) + (
2
3
− ρ2Y )u(0) (29)
Wv(f4) = 〈v|Fˆ4|v〉 = 1
3
u(0) +
2
3
u(100) (30)
We observe that Wv(f1) and Wv(f4) do not depend on the state pv, hence they are ambiguity-free, i.e.
independent of the state, while Wv(f2) and Wv(f3) do depend on pv. This means that it is possible to find
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a state pw1 , e.g., the state represented in (21), such that Ww1(f1) > Ww1(f2), and a state pw2 , e.g., the
state represented in (22), such that Ww2(f4) > Ww2(f3). These two states reproduce Ellsberg preferences,
in agreement with an ambiguity aversion attitude.
We repeated the Ellsberg three-color experiment, asking 57 persons, chosen among our colleagues and
friends, to rank the four acts in Table 1, Section 4 (Aerts, Sozzo & Tapia, 2014). We found that 34
participants preferred acts f1 and f4, 12 participants preferred acts f2 and f3, 7 participants preferred acts
f2 and f4, and 6 participants preferred acts f1 and f3. This makes the weights with preference of acts
f1 over act f2 to be 0.68 against 0.32, and the weights with preference of act f4 over act f3 to be 0.69
against 0.31. Hence, 46 participants over 57 chose f1 and f4 or the inversion f2 and f3, for an ‘inversion
percentage’ of 78%, thus confirming the typical behavior observed in the Ellsberg three-color example.
A quantum model for these data can be constructed by finding two orthogonal states pw1 and pw2 ,
represented by the unit vectors |w1〉 and |w2〉, respectively, such that
〈w1|Fˆ1 − Fˆ2|w1〉 = 0.68 (31)
〈w2|Fˆ4 − Fˆ3|w2〉 = 0.69 (32)
where Fˆi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, are defined in (23)–(26). In the canonical basis of C
3, the solution is
|w1〉 = ( 1√
3
, 0.787ei28
◦
, 0.216ei9.3
◦
) (33)
|w2〉 = ( 1√
3
, 0.206ei208
◦
, 0.790ei189.3
◦
) (34)
as we have proved in Aerts & Sozzo (2016). The states pw1 and pw2 represented in (33) and (34) identify the
subjective probability distributions µw1 and µw2 , respectively, reproducing the ambiguity aversion pattern
of the experiment, for an utility value u(100)−u(0) ≈ 2.4. But, generally speaking, preferences do depend
on the state pv of the Ellsberg entity. This completes the construction of a quantum model for the Ellsberg
three-color example, which follows the prescriptions in Section 5.
5.2 Application to the Machina reflection example
In this section we represent the ‘Machina reflection example’ within the formalism. We start from the
reflection example with lower tail shifts. The DM entity, which we call the ‘Machina entity’, is the urn
with 10 red or yellow balls and 10 black or green balls, in both cases in unknown proportion. A possible
state pv of the Machina entity has a cognitive nature and is represented by the unit vector |v〉 of the complex
Hilbert space C4 over complex numbers. We denote by (1, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 0, 1) the
unit vectors of the canonical basis of C4.
Let us consider the elementary, exhaustive and mutually exclusive events ER: “a red ball is drawn”, EY :
“a yellow ball is drawn”, EB : “a black ball is drawn”, and EG: “a green ball is drawn”. They define a ‘color
measurement’ that can be performed on the Machina entity. This color measurement has four outcomes
corresponding to the four colors red, yellow, black and green, and it is represented by a Hermitian operator
with eigenvectors |R〉 = (1, 0, 0, 0), |Y 〉 = (0, 1, 0, 0), |B〉 = (0, 0, 1, 0) and |G〉 = (0, 0, 0, 1) or, equivalently,
by the spectral family {Pi = |i〉〈i| | i = R,Y,B,G}. Hence, the event Ei is represented by the orthogonal
projection operator Pi, i = R,Y,B,G. In the canonical basis of C
4, a state pv of the Machina entity is
represented by the unit vector
|v〉 = ρReiθR |R〉+ ρY eiθY |Y 〉+ ρBeiθB |B〉+ ρGeiθG |G〉 = (ρReiθR , ρY eiθY , ρBeiθB , ρGeiθG) (35)
By using quantum probabilistic rules, the probability µv(Ei) of drawing a ball of color i, i = R,Y,B,G,
when the Machina entity is in a state pv is given by
µv(Ei) = 〈v|Pi|v〉 = |〈i|v〉|2 = ρ2i (36)
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The reflection with lower tail shifts situation requires that ρ2R + ρ
2
Y = 1/2 = ρ
2
B + ρ
2
G. Therefore, a state
pv of the Machina entity is represented by the unit vector
|v〉 = (ρReiθR ,
√
1
2
− ρ2ReiθY , ρBeiθB ,
√
1
2
− ρ2BeiθG) (37)
As in the Ellsberg case, let us suppose that the initial state p0 of the Machina entity completely reflects
the symmetry between the different colors. Thus, p0 is represented by the unit vector |v0〉 = 12(1, 1, 1, 1).
Whenever the decision-maker is presented with the Machina paradox situation, her/his pondering about
the choices to make gives rise to a cognitive context, which changes the state of the Machina entity from
p0 to a generally different state pw, represented by the unit vector |w〉, as in (37). In this framework, the
pondering about a choice between f1 and f2 will make the initial state p0 of the Machina entity change
to a state pw1 that is generally different from the state pw2 in which the Machina entity changes from the
initial state p0 in a pondering about the choice between f3 and f4.
Let us now come to the representation of the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 in Table 2, Section 4. For a given
utility function u, to be estimated from empirical data, we respectively associate f1, f2, f3 and f4 with the
Hermitian operators
Fˆ1 = u(0)PR + u(50)PY + u(25)PB + u(25)PG (38)
Fˆ2 = u(0)PR + u(25)PY + u(50)PB + u(25)PG (39)
Fˆ3 = u(25)PR + u(50)PY + u(25)PB + u(0)PG (40)
Fˆ4 = u(25)PR + u(25)PY + u(50)PB + u((0)PG (41)
The corresponding expected utilities in a state pv are
Wv(f1) = 〈v|Fˆ1|v〉 = u(0)ρ2R + u(50)ρ2Y +
1
2
u(25) (42)
Wv(f2) = 〈v|Fˆ2|v〉 = u(0)ρ2R + u(25)ρ2Y + u(50)ρ2B + u(25)ρ2G (43)
Wv(f3) = 〈v|Fˆ2|v〉 = u(25)ρ2R + u(50)ρ2Y + u(25)ρ2B + u(0)ρ2G (44)
Wv(f4) = 〈v|Fˆ4|v〉 = 1
2
u(25) + u(50)ρ2B + u(0)ρ
2
G (45)
All expected utilities depend on the state pv, thus it is possible to find a state pw1 such that Ww1(f1) >
Ww1(f2) (Ww1(f2) > Ww1(f1)), and a state pw2 such that Ww2(f4) > Ww2(f3) (Ww2(f3) > Ww2(f4)).
Indeed, let us consider the state pY G describing the cognitive situation where there are no red balls and
no black balls. This state is represented by the unit vector
|vY G〉 = (0,
√
1
2
eiθY , 0,
√
1
2
eiθG) (46)
Then, let us consider the state pRB describing the cognitive situation where there are no yellow balls and
no green balls. This state is represented by the unit vector
|vRB〉 = (
√
1
2
eiθR , 0,
√
1
2
eiθB , 0) (47)
By using (42), (43), (44) and (45), we have WY G(f1) =WRB(f4) and WY G(f2) =WRB(f3). Therefore, the
states pY G and pRB perfectly reproduce informational symmetry in the Machina reflection example with
lower tail shifts.
19
Let us now apply the quantum model for the Machina paradox situation to represent the data collected
in L’Haridon & Placido (2010) on the reflection example with lower tail shifts. These authors asked
94 students to rank the four acts in Table 2, Section 4. The students’ response was that 11 students
preferred acts f1 and f3, 44 students preferred acts f1 and f4, 15 students preferred acts f2 and f4, and 24
students preferred acts f2 and f3. This entails that 68 students over 94 reversed their preferences, for an
inversion percentage of 72%, thus violating subjective EUT and in agreement with Machina’s expectations
(L’Haridon & Placido, 2010). Equivalently, a rate of 0.59 preferred act f1 over act f2, and a rate of 0.63
preferred act f4 over f3. As we have seen in Section 4, this result is problematical also from the point of
view of Choquet expected utility.
A quantum mechanical model for the experimental data above can be constructed by finding two
orthogonal states pw1 and pw2 , represented by the unit vectors |w1〉 and |w2〉, respectively, such that
〈w1|Fˆ1 − Fˆ2|w1〉 = 0.59 (48)
〈w2|Fˆ4 − Fˆ3|w2〉 = 0.63 (49)
where Fˆi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, are defined in (38)–(41). In the canonical basis of C
4, the solution is
|w1〉 = (0, 0.71ei1.6◦ , 0.38ei1◦ , 0.60ei185.2◦ ) (50)
|w2〉 = (0.71ei0.7◦ , 0.05ei191.8◦ , 0.62ei2.9◦ , 0.34ei7.4◦) (51)
as we have proved in Aerts & Sozzo (2016). The states pw1 and pw2 represented in (50) and (51) identify
the subjective probability distributions µw1 and µw2 , respectively, reproducing the experimental pattern,
for an utility value u(50) − u(25) ≈ 1.636. But, generally speaking, preferences do depend on the state
pv of the Machina entity. This completes the construction of a quantum model for the Machina reflection
example with lower tail shifts, which follows the prescriptions in Section 5.
L’Haridon and Placido (2010) also tested the reflection example with upper tail shifts. The authors
asked the same 94 students to rank the four acts in Table 3, Section 4. The students’ response was that
8 students preferred acts f1 and f3, 47 students preferred acts f1 and f4, 6 students preferred acts f2 and
f4, and 33 students preferred acts f2 and f3. This entails that 47 + 33 = 80 students over 94 reversed
their preferences, for a ratio of 0.85, thus violating subjective EUT and in agreement with Machina’s
expectations. Equivalently, a rate of 0.59 preferred act f1 over act f2, and a rate of 0.56 preferred act f4
over f3.
A quantum model for these experimental data can be constructed by following along the lines above.
We have proved in Aerts & Sozzo (2016) that the states pw1 and pw2 reproducing the data collected in the
Machina reflection example with upper tail shifts are represented by the unit vectors
|w1〉 = (0.02ei0.3◦ , 0.71ei11.6◦ , 0.38ei1.3◦ , 0.60ei196.5◦ ) (52)
|w2〉 = (0.71ei0.7◦ , 0, 0.59ei1.7◦ , 0.39ei16.9◦ ) (53)
for an utility value u(50)− u(25) = 1.636.
In all the examples above, we have proved that it is possible to reconstruct the quantum states, hence
the quantum probability distributions representing the priors underlying concrete decisions in the presence
of ambiguity. However, we have also argued that a more complete mathematical treatment suggests that
preferences under ambiguity depend on the state of the DM entity, and that a DM entity should be
associated with a family of subjective probability distributions parametrized by its states.
The modeling of the Machina paradox situations – we have also modeled the ‘50:51 example’ in Aerts,
Sozzo & Tapia (2012) – is relevant, in our opinion, because the most established non-Bayesian models face
difficulties when trying to reproduce the expected pattern (Machina, 2009; Baillon, L’Harison & Placido,
2011).
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5.3 Possible extensions and a definition of ambiguity
We conclude the presentation of the quantum theoretical framework with some technical remarks.
The quantum theoretical model for human preferences can be extended to the case in which the set of
states of nature S has a continuous cardinality, as follows.
We introduce, in addition to S , the set of consequences X , the set of acts F = {f : S −→ X }, the
utility function u : X −→ ℜ. Further, let H be the Hilbert space representing states of the DM entity, and
let {|α〉} be an orthonormal basis of H, so that 〈α|α′〉 = δ(α − α′), where δ(·) is the δ-Dirac distribution.
For every state pv ∈ ΣDM describing the DM entity, the represented vector |v〉 can be written as
|v〉 =
∫
ℜ
〈α|v〉|α〉dα =
∫
ℜ
c(α)|α〉dα (54)
An event E is represented by the orthogonal projection operator PE =
∫
E
|α〉〈α|dα. Hence, the subjective
probability that the event E occurs when the DM entity is in the state pv is
µv(E) = 〈v|
( ∫
E
|α〉〈α|dα
)
|v〉 =
∫
E
|〈α|v〉|2dα =
∫
ℜ
d||Pα|v〉||2 (55)
where the integral is intended in the Lebesgue sense.
The act f is instead represented by the Hermitian operator
Fˆ =
∫
ℜ
u(f(α))|α〉〈α|dα (56)
Hence, the expected utility of the act f in the state pv is
Wv(f) = 〈v|Fˆ |v〉 =
∫
ℜ
u(f(α))|c(α)|2dα =
∫
ℜ
u(f(α))d||Pα|v〉||2 (57)
The right side of (57) is also useful when one does not specifies the cardinality of the set of states. It is
indeed sufficient to require that the integral is intended in the Lebesgue-Stieltjes sense.
The treatment of the Ellsberg and Machina paradox situations enables providing a general definition
of ambiguity within the quantum theoretical framework, as follows.
We say that ‘an event E is unambiguous’ if the subjective probability µv(E) does not depend on the
state pv of the DM entity. In the Ellsberg three-color example, the event ER: “a red ball will be drawn” is
indeed unambiguous in the sense specified here. Indeed, for every state pv of the Ellsberg entity, represented
by the unit vector |v〉 ∈ C3, µv(ER) = 13 .
Finally, we say that ‘an act f is unambiguous’ if the expected utility Wv(f) does not depend on the
state pv of the DM entity. Again in the Ellsberg three-color example, the act f4 is indeed unambiguous
in the sense specified above, since, for every state pv of the Ellsberg entity, represented by the unit vector
|v〉 ∈ C3, Wv(f4) = 13(u(0) + u(100)).
6 Conclusive remarks
We have worked out in this paper a theoretical framework to represent preferences and decisions under
uncertainty. This framework uses the mathematical formalism of quantum theory. In it, subjective proba-
bilities are represented by families of quantum probability distributions, parametrized by the state of the
DM entity under investigation. The interaction with the overall cognitive landscape, which includes the
decision-maker’s pondering about two acts, provokes a change of state of the DM entity, which enables
modeling of the ambiguity aversion affecting Ellsberg- and Machina-like preferences. However, the present
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theoretical framework is flexible enough to reproduce different experimental patterns arising from different
attitudes toward ambiguity. We have also stressed that the present approach allows modeling of beliefs,
but in a generally non-Bayesian setting where a kind of ‘contextual risk’ is present. Finally, the present
approach suggests the development of a quantum-based subjective EUT with state-dependent preferences
between acts.
In our opinion, this quantum theoretical framework can be successfully used to represent ambiguity-
laden situations outside pure decision theory, in particular in strategic management decisions and some
long standing economic puzzles. We conclude this paper with some hints in this direction.
Experiments have revealed a mixture of ambiguity aversion and ambiguity attraction in decisions under
uncertainty. In this respect, managers typically compare the performance of an investment with a bench-
mark, or targeted performance, e.g., the return on investment (ROI), or the internal rate of return (IRR).
A ‘gain’ is realized when the performance is above the benchmark, a ‘loss’ is realized when the performance
is below the benchmark. For example, risk occurs in a situation where the probability that the ROI of
a given investment is above the benchmark is x per cent. Ambiguity occurs instead in a situation where
the probability that the ROI of the investment is above the benchmark is between (x −∆) and (x +∆).
Viscusi and Chesson (1999) identified a ‘fear effect’, as well as a ‘hope effect’, in their experimental study.
More precisely, they found that, as the probability of a loss increases, managers become less ambiguity
averse, reaching a ‘crossover point’ at which they become ambiguity seeking, which indicates a shift from
a fear to a hope effect. Viceversa, as the probability of a gain increases, managers become less ambiguity
seeking, reaching a ‘crossover point’ at which they become ambiguity averse, which indicates this time
a shift from a hope to a fear effect. This result was confirmed by Ho, Keller and Keltyka (2002). The
quantum theoretical framework can reproduce this dual behavior by reconstructing the quantum states,
hence the subjective probability distributions underlying the observed behavior, as we have done in the
three color Ellsberg urn and the Machina reflection example (Aerts & Sozzo, 2016).
Coming to economics and finance, Epstein and Miao (2003) have put forward that ambiguity aversion
may explain the ‘home bias puzzle’ in international finance: people prefer to trade stocks of their own
country rather than foreign stocks. This is in principle compatible with the quantum theoretical approach,
where ambiguity aversion can be explained in terms of the overall cognitive landscape surrounding the
decision-making situation. Further, Hansen, Sargent and Wang (2002) have shown that ambiguity aversion
models lead to market prices that are closer to the empirical prices than the prices predicted by EUT, which
may explain the ‘equity premium puzzle’. Again, this behavior can in principle be reproduced within a
theoretical framework where ambiguity aversion depends on the way the cognitive landscape influences the
DM entity.
We believe that the quantum theoretical approach presented here can be naturally applied to the
fascinating problems above, and we plan to dedicate future research to this.
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